Results of the investigation into the Schiphol – Detroit flight

The failed attempt to blow up passenger flight NW 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit was prepared quite professionally but carried out in an amateurish manner. This is evident from the provisional investigation by the Dutch authorities.

The explosives used cannot be made easily and not without risks. Furthermore, the explosives and methods used correspond to those used in previous attacks. In addition, the investigation has revealed that the suspect, Omar al-F, had a valid visa to travel to the US. The passenger list submitted prior to the flight was no reason for the US to request extra measures. During his transfer at Schiphol, the suspect did not leave the customs area and was subject to a check with a metal detector in that area in line with protocol. Nothing exceptional emerged from that check.

Body scanner

The Minister of Justice, in close consultation with the American authorities, has decided to introduce the body scanner with immediate effect in the safety procedures at Schiphol for flights to the United States.
These measures were announced by Guusje ter Horst (interim Minister of Justice during the absence of Ernst Hirsch Ballin) in a letter to the Dutch Lower House of Parliament concerning the initial results of the investigations carried out in the Netherlands following the attempted attack on the flight of 25 December from Amsterdam Airport Schiphol to Detroit (US).

The suspect who attempted to blow up the plane on 25 December left Lagos in Nigeria on 24 December 2009 on flight KL 0588 to Schiphol. This flight arrived on 25 December 2009 at 5.37 a.m. Dutch time (CET). That day, he departed from Schiphol, with the prior permission of the American authorities, at 8.55 a.m. (CET) on flight NW 253 to Detroit (US). Boarding started at 6.40 a.m. This is a customary transfer route for Nigerians flying to the United States. The suspect had a return ticket, purchased in Accra (Ghana).

Security check

All airlines flying to, from or via the United States are obliged to issue details of all passengers and crew to the American authorities prior to departure. In this case, the American authorities gave the airline permission to transport the suspect, without requesting any extra security measures. During the security check, no suspicious facts emerged that were reason to classify the suspect as a risk. He possessed a valid visa for the United States. The suspect spent the transfer time (several hours) in the international lounge at the airport. The suspect was not known to the Dutch authorities.

On the basis of the information available at present, it can be concluded that the improvised explosive was on the suspect’s body, and it was positioned in such a way that it would not attract attention. The main component of the explosive was 80 grams pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN, also referred to as ‘pentrite’). This is a very powerful conventional explosive, which cannot be made easily and not without risks. Remnants of a syringe were also found containing liquid chemicals. This would probably have acted as the explosive trigger. Prior to the incident, the suspect was said to have spent quite a lot of time in the aircraft toilet, probably to assemble separate components into an ‘Improvised Explosive Device’ (IED).

Previous attacks

Despite the failure of the attack, the method in this case points to quite a professional operation, comparable to a number of previous attempts to blow up a passenger aircraft. Previous examples include the ‘shoe bomber’, who attempted to blow up an aircraft using explosives (also pentrite with TATP as the trigger) in his shoes, and the failed 2006 attacks on transatlantic flights using liquid explosives in soft drinks bottles which were to have been smuggled on board. The most recent example of a similar attack was that on a Saudi prince in August 2009. The perpetrator died during the attack and the prince suffered only slight injuries.

Investigation

Immediately following the incident, the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee – KMAr) began an investigation into the circumstances. The KMAr, assisted by the National Investigation Service (Nationale Recherche – NR), launched a criminal investigation headed by the Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie – OM) into possible punishable offences committed on Dutch territory (including the KLM aircraft that brought the suspect from Lagos to Schiphol). The offences include being part of a terrorist organisation and carrying out preparatory actions for a terrorist offence by flying to Schiphol with a Dutch aircraft, remaining at Schiphol airport, and transferring to carry out the attack on the flight from Schiphol to Detroit. The investigation is also targeting the safety procedures at the airport. Using flight data and CCT images, the investigation is focusing on these activities and possible contacts made by the suspect during the transfer at Schiphol and during the preceding flight on the KLM aircraft. Where necessary, legal assistance applications will be exchanged between the Netherlands and the United States.

National terrorist threat assessment

The incident in Detroit is not connected to the scaling down of the national terrorist threat assessment (Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland) to ‘limited’ earlier this month. The event has no consequences for this level. The scaling down had no direct consequences for specific security measures at, for instance, Schiphol. The incident of 25 December 2009 is a further indication of the probability of an attack in the airports sector and therefore justifies the alert level of ‘slight risk’ for this sector, as well as for the ensuing security measures. The extra measures taken at Schiphol following the most recent incident therefore relate only to flights to and over the United States.

In close consultation with the American authorities, the Minister of Justice has decided to introduce the security scanner with immediate effect. This should substantially increase the likelihood of discovering a planned attack. In addition, at the request of the Netherlands, the introduction of the security scan is being argued for at European level.